We present a protocol for anonymous communication over the Internet. Our protocol, called P 5 (Peer-to-Peer Personal Privacy Protocol) provides sender-, receiver-, and sender-receiver anonymity. P 5 is designed to be implemented over the current Internet protocols, and does not require any special infrastructure support. A novel feature of P 5 is that it allows individual participants to trade-off degree of anonymity for communication ef ciency, and hence can be used to scalably implement large anonymous groups. We present a description of P 5 , an analysis of its anonymity and communication ef ciency, and evaluate its performance using detailed packet-level simulations.
Introduction
We present the Peer-to-Peer Personal Privacy Protocol (P 5 )
which can be used for scalable anonymous communication over the Internet. P 5 provides sender-, receiver-, and sender-receiver anonymity, and can be implemented over the current Internet protocols. P 5 can scale to provide anonymity for hundreds of thousands of users all communicating simultaneously and anonymously.
A system provides receiver anonymity if and only if it is not possible to ascertain who the receiver of a particular message is (even though the receiver may be able to identify the sender).
Analogously, a system provides sender anonymity if and only if it is not possible for the receiver of a message to identify the original sender. It is not possible to provide perfect anonymity in a communication system since it is usually possible to enumerate all possible senders or recipients of a particular message.
In general, the degree of sender/receiver anonymity is measured by the size of the set of people who could have sent/received a particular message. There have been a number of systems designed to provide receiver anonymity [2, 5] , and a number of systems that provide sender anonymity [8, 9] . In these systems, * The rst author is with the Department of Computer Science, Uni- individual senders (or receivers) cannot determine the destination (or origin) of messages beyond a certain set of hosts in the network.
Our system, P 5 , provides both receiver and sender anonymity and also provides sender-receiver anonymity. Speci cally, we assume that an adversary in our system may passively monitor every packet on every link of a network, and is able to correlate individual packets across links. Thus, the adversary can mount any passive attack on the underlying networking infrastructure. However, the adversary is not able to invert encryptions and read encrypted messages. The adversary can also read all signaling messages in the system. Our system provides receiver and sender anonymity under this rather strong adversarial model and provides the sender-receiver anonymity (or unlinkability) property. Thus, the adversary cannot determine if (or when) any two parties in the system are communicating. P Unlike previous known solutions, P 5 can be used to implement a scalable wide-area system with many thousand active participants, all of whom may communicate simultaneously.
A naive solution
Consider a global broadcast channel. All participants in the anonymous communication send xed length packets onto this channel at a xed rate. These packets are encrypted such that only the recipient of the message may decrypt the packet, e.g., by using the receiver's published public key. Assume that there is a mechanism to hide, spoof, or re-write sender addresses, e.g., by implementing the broadcast using an application-layer peerto-peer ring, and that all messages are sent to the entire group.
Lastly, every message is hop-by-hop encrypted, and thus, it is not possible to map a speci c incoming message to a node to a particular outgoing message. (In essence, every node acts as a mix [1] ). It is possible that a node may not be actively communicating at any given time, but in order to maintain the xed communication rate, it would have to send a packet anyway. Such a packet would be a noise packet, and any packet destined for a particular receiver would be a signal packet.
This system provides receiver anonymity, since the sender does not know where in the broadcast group the receiver is or which host or address the receiver is using; the sender only knows that the receiver is part of the broadcast group. This system also provides sender anonymity, since all messages to a given receiver (in case of a ring) come from a single upstream node, and the receiver cannot determine the original sender of a message. Lastly, this solution also provides unlinkability from a passive adversary since the adversary is not able to gain any extra information from monitoring any (or all) network links. For example, suppose node a is sending messages to node b. The adversary sees the same number of messages from node a whether it were conversing with b or not, and all of the messages are sent to the same broadcast address. Similarly, whether a talks to b or not, b receives the same number of messages from a over any suitably large interval. Note that the adversary is not able to trace a message from the sender to a receiver or vice-versa because of the hop-by-hop encryption, and thus, even if one end of a communication colludes with the adversary, the anonymity of the other party is not compromised.
This naive solution does not scale due to its broadcast nature.
As the number of people in the channel increases, the available bandwidth for any useful communication decreases linearly, and end-to-end reliability decreases exponentially. It is possible to increase the bandwidth utilization and reliability by limiting the number of people in a broadcast group, but then two parties who want to communicate may end up in different groups.
P
5 is based upon this basic broadcast channel principle; we scale the system by creating a hierarchy of broadcast channels.
Clearly, any broadcast-based system, including P 5 will not provide high bandwidth ef ciency, both in terms of how many bits it takes a senderreceiver pair to exchange a bit of information, and how many extra bits the network carries to carry one bit of useful information. P 5 allows users to choose how inef cient the communication is, and provides a scalable control structure for securely and anonymously connecting users in different logical broadcast groups. We present an overview of P incompatible levels of bandwidth utilization and anonymity).
Chaum introduced sender anonymity in [1] , and senderreceiver anonymity (as the dining cryptographers problem)
in [2] . The solution presented in [2] 
Roadmap
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: we discuss related work in Section 2. We describe the P 5 algorithm in detail in Section 3, and present a set of analytic bounds on performance in Section 5.
In Section 6, we analyze results from packet-level P 5 simulator. We discuss future work and conclude in Section 7.
Related Work
We discuss prior work related to P 5 . We begin with a discussion of the Dining Cryptographers problem, and discuss some other systems that provide anonymity over the Internet.
Dining Cryptographers and Mixes
Dining Cryptographers The Dining Cryptographers (DCnet) protocol [2] provides sender anonymity under an adversary model similar to P 5 . DC-Net assumes a public key infrastructure, and users send encrypted broadcasts to the entire group, thus achieving receiver anonymity. However, unlike P 5 , all members of the group are made aware of when a message is sent, so Dining Cryptographers does not have the same level of sender-receiver anonymity. Also, in DC-net, only one user can send at a time, so it takes additional bandwidth to handle collisions and contention [10] . Lastly, a DC-net participant xes its anonymity vs. bandwidth trade off when joining the system, and there are no provisions to rescale that trade off when others join the system.
Mixes A mix is a process that provides anonymity via packet re-shuf ing. Mixes were introduced by Chaum in [1] . Mixes work best in series, and need a constant amount of traf c to avoid delay while preserving anonymity. P 5 does both by creating a hierarchy of mixes, and the constant stream of signal and noise packets serve to keep the mixes operational.
Recent Internet-based Anonymous Communications Work
We describe four anonymity protocols that can be implemented over the Internet Crowds, Hordes, and Onion Routing Both Crowds [8] and the more recent Hordes [9] provide sender anonymity. The basic idea in both these systems is similar to Onion Routing [6] , in which messages between communicating users are routed on an application-layer overlay using paths different than the shortest path. The receiver cannot resolve the sender of a particular message since messages take different, potentially randomly chosen, routes through the network. However, neither system can provide anonymity when confronted by a passive observer who can mount statistical attacks by tracing and correlating packets throughout the network. None of these systems provide receiver anonymity.
FreeNet Freenet [4] provides an anonymous publishsubscribe system over the Internet using an application-layer overlay, much like P
.
However, FreeNet is designed for anonymous storage and retrieval, and the anonymity issues for such a system are different than a system like P 5 that provides anonymity when communicating parties are on-line. There is no notion of noise or signal, etc., and the major issues in FreeNet are decoupling/hiding authorship from a particular document, and providing fault-tolerant anonymous availability for a set of static documents.
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The P 1 It is entirely possible that the N keys belong to n different individuals, such that n < N . We discuss this issue in Section 3.5.
necessary, the addition of the bitmask will signi cantly ease our exposition. We use the notation (b/m) to represent the contents of a group, where b is the bitstring, and m is the number of valid bits.
The root of L consists of the null bitstring and a zero length mask. We represent the root with the label ( /0). The left child of the root contains the group (0/1) and the right child is (1/1).
The rest of the tree is constructed as shown in Figure 1 . For example, note that group (0/1) represents the bitstring 0 and the group (00/2) represents the bitstring 00.
Each group in L corresponds to a broadcast channel in P Thus, a message sent to a group (b/m) is sent to three distinct regions of the L tree:
• We describe the precise networking and systems requirements of P 5 and underlying protocols in Section 4.3.
Each user in the system joins a set of such broadcast groups. 
Mapping users to L
We use a secure public hash function (H (·)) to map users to a L node (group). Consider user A, with public-key be secret, and it should not be possible to determine which precise group a user is joined to. Thus, given a public key, it is public knowledge which set of groups a user may be in, but it is dif cult to determine which speci c group in this set the user has chosen.
Suppose users A and B are mapped to some arbitrary groups in the tree L. We say a channel c is common between A and B if and only if messages sent to c are forwarded to both A and B. Suppose A and B join groups (bA/mA) and (bB/mB) respectively, and assume both know each other's public key. Since The communication ef ciency can be improved as follows.
Instead of sending messages through ( /0), A could try to send messages on to some group (bB/m), m > 0. B would receive these messages, and may reply back to A. However, in doing so, B sacri ces some anonymity since A can now map B to a smaller set of users. (A maps B to a smaller set using a Difference Attack described in Section 3.5). In general, B can choose to communicate back to A using any length mask; however, longer masks trade-off anonymity for communication efciency. B can selectively trust some users and reveal longer masks for these trusted users, but in general, the anonymity of B is bounded by the longest mask that it has revealed to any other However, if A and B only join one group each, and the public keys are uniformly hashed to channels on the L tree, then there is approximately 50% probability that ( /0) will be the only channel that A and B would have in common! Similarly, for any given node, an exponentially high number of nodes would be farther away on the logical broadcast tree, and in general, the communication on the system will not be very effective. Once again, we are reduced to using the inef cient global broadcast channel for most communications.
Our solution to this inef cient routing is as follows: each user joins a small number of groups on the logical tree. For each joined group, users generate another public-private key pair, called routing key. These routing keys are generated locally, and do not require any global coordination. In fact, it should not be possible to map a user's routing key to their communication key, otherwise, the user's anonymity can be compromised (using an Intersection Attack, Section 3.5).
When user A joins a group c, it periodically sends a message to the channel listing other channels that it is joined to. This message serves as a routing advertisement, and will be used to ef ciently send messages along the lower levels of the L tree.
In general, the advertisements from a node contains the set of channels it can directly reach, the set of channels it can reach using one other node, and so on. In effect, these t routing keys generate lateral edges in the tree. In Section 5, we show that typically, each user needs to join only a few groups (≤ 3) for any two users in P 5 to have short paths (≤ 2 channel crossings) between them with high probability.
We note that a user joins a set of groups only when it enters the system, and should not change the set of channels it is part of. Otherwise, once again, yet another intersection attack becomes feasible that can compromise their anonymity. Each group joined by a user corresponds to a one hop peering in the underlying network 2 ; we call the set of these peerings the physical connectivity graph, and denote it with P.
Signal and Noise
Our description of the P 5 protocol is nearly complete: however, we still need a crucial piece. Assuming packet sources cannot be traced from the broadcast messages (See Section 4 for the precise packet format), the protocol as described provides sender and receiver anonymity. We assume that each messages is of the same size and is encrypted per-hop, and thus it is not possible to map an outgoing message (packet) to a speci c packet that the node received in the past. However, a passive observer can still mount an easy statistical attack and trace a communication by correlating a packet stream from a communicating source to a sink.
Thus, we add the notion of noise to the system. The noise packets should be added such that a passive correlation attack becomes infeasible. There are many possible good noisegeneration algorithms, and we use the following simple scheme.
Each P 5 user, at all times, generates xed amount of trafc destined to channel chosen uniformly at random. A packet transmitted from a node is one of the following:
• A packet (noise or signal) that was received from some incoming interface that this node is forwarding onto some other channel(s). (The precise forwarding rule for P 5 is described in Section 4).
• A signal packet that has been locally generated.
• A noise packet that has been locally generated.
Note that to an external observer, there is no discernible difference between these three scenarios. In general, only the source and destination of a communication can distinguish between noise and signal packets. They are treated with equal disdain at all other nodes.
Message Dropping Algorithms In any communication system without explicit feedback, e.g. our channel broadcasts, message queues may build at slow nodes or at nodes with high degree. In P 5 , members may simply drop any message they do not have the bandwidth or processing capacity to handle.
The global properties of the system depend upon how messages are dropped. We have considered two different dropping algorithms: 2 Clearly, these are one hop transport level peerings, and not one physical hop peerings.
• Uniform drop: This is the simplest scheme in which messages from the input queue are dropped with equal probability until the input queue size is below the maximum threshold.
• Non-uniform drop: In this scheme, messages which are destined to a channel higher up in L are dropped preferentially.
We have experimented with several variations of this scheme; the speci c scheme which we use for our simulations drops packets destined for higher nodes with an exponentially higher probability.
If most of the end-to-end paths in a P Proof.
We consider the sender-, receiver-, and sender-receiver anonymity cases separately.
• Sender Anonymity
Sender anonymity is the size of the set of the nodes that group. However, inter-channel routers transmit packets between channels, and over time every node in the system is causally related to every other node in the system.
Suppose a malicious receiver tries to expose a sender.
It can, at best (assuming there are no other cross channel packets), causally relate packets to its own broadcast group. Further, if the receiver is able to determine and compromise the router node, then the sender anonymity becomes the effective broadcast group of the sender.
In case the receiver cannot compromise the channel router node, the sender's anonymity is the size of the entire system, even in the presence of an all-powerful passive adversary.
• Receiver Anonymity • Sender-receiver anonymity
Since all nodes in the system send at a constant rate, and all packets are pair-wise encrypted between each hop, we claim that it is impossible for a passive observer to distinguish noise from signal packets. Since the observer cannot distinguish signal packets, it cannot discern if or when A communicates, and thus, it cannot determine when A is communicating with any other node B.
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Assume that the rate at which some user A sends packets does not change when it is sending signal versus noise packets. In this case, the distribution of packets, whether they are signal packets or noise, does not affect the security of the node. Thus, a nice property of our system is that the anonymity of any node A depends only upon the length of the mask that A is willing to respond to.
Attacks
In this section, we outline a number of attacks that a system like P 5 must guard against, and show why P 5 is invulnerable to all these attacks.
• Correlation Attack: We have already alluded to this attack in which a passive observer is able to (statistically) track signal packets from a source to a destination, thus violating sender-receiver anonymity. In P 5 the noise packets thwart this attack.
• • Difference Attack: If an adversary can map the user to some set and can assert that the user is not in some other set, then it can map the user to the difference between these two sets.
For example, suppose user A has revealed an m bit mask.
In this case, it should not respond or react to packets sent • Mob attack: In this case, a (set of) malicious users (the mob) collude to try to expose some user A. These users can all join the same channel as A, and reduce the efciency of the channel. This can cause A to expose more bits of its mask or cause other legitimate users to leave the channel. In either case, the mob has reduced A's anonymity to the set of remaining legitimate users. This is a dif cult attack to handle in a system which provides anonymity, since it is (hopefully) not possible to map public keys back to individuals. In P 5 , this attack can be handled by choosing a security parameter larger than the size of largest mob.
Note that in practice, it may be possible for a single attacker to spoof multiple addresses. However, since we use unicast and each member of the group must communicate with others, all these addresses must actually exist on the network. In practice, however, it is unlikely that an attacker can co-opt addresses from many different Autonomous Systems (ASs); and A can thwart this attack by ensuring that there are enough different ASs represented in the channel that it responds on. However, an all-powerful active attacker can mount this attack from enough different ASs to expose any user. Thus P 5 is susceptible to adversaries who can actively manipulate (e.g. by generating packets from arbitrary ASs) large parts of the network.
Details
In this section, we present details from our implementation of P 5 . We have implemented P Packet Format We use xed length packets of size 1 KB.
The xed packet length is used to eliminate any information an adversary can gain by monitoring packet lengths.
The P 5 header only contains the identi er for the rst hop destination channel (a (b/m) pair). (It could, equivalently, also contain the ultimate destination, but we chose the rst-hop destination in cleartext option). In our implementation, b is a 32 bit unsigned integer, and m is a 6 bit integer. If the packet is a signal packet, the rest of the packet is encrypted using the next hop receiver's public key. Since packets may need to be encapsulated, and each packet is the same size, each packet also contains a padding eld which is the size of the P 5 header.
The data part of the P 5 packet contains a set of xed size chunks each of which is encrypted with the receiver's public key. These chunks are formed naturally by many public-key encryptions. The decrypted data part of the P 5 packet contains a checksum which the receiver uses to determine whether a packet is destined for itself or not. Each chunk can be decrypted independently; thus, a receiver does not need to decrypt an entire noise packet, it can discard a packet as soon as the rst chunk fails its checksum. For ef ciency, the rst chunk of a signal packet may also include a symetric cipher key for use in decrypting the other chunks, as symetric cipher decryptions tend to be faster than asymetric ones.
Regardless of whether a packet decrypts properly, the receiver schedules each packet for further delivery within the local channel using the forwarding rule described below.
The rst chunk of a signal packet contains an encrypted bit which determines whether a packet should be forwarded onto some other channel, or whether the packet is destined for the current node. It also contains a channel identi er for the ultimate destination for the packet, which the current node uses to choose an outgoing channel.
When a node receives a packet with the forward bit set, it interprets the rest of the data as another P 5 packet, and if possible, forwards it onto the speci ed channel. In the forwarding step, the process at a channel router is different depending on whether the packet is at its ultimate channel or not:
• If the packet is not at its nal channel, the current node replaces the rst chunk with a new chunk in which the forward bit is set, sets the proper ultimate destination channel, and encrypts this chunk with the public key of the next hop.
If the packet is already is the destination channel, then the data part of the packet is already formatted with the proper address and has a valid rst chunk encrypted by the public key of the intended recipient. The current node adds a last chunk at end of the packet with random bits to increment the packet length to the xed system size.
If the forward bit is not set, then this signal packet is delivered locally.
Forwarding within a channel Since each logical channel is a tree, each node can use the following simple forwarding algorithm to forward a packet p sent to some arbitrary (b/m) channel on L.
Forward p to a peer on channel c iff only if p did not come in on c and if c passes the min-common-pre x check with respect to (b/m).
Note that it is important that the output order of the packets not be determined by the input order, else it becomes possible to correlate packets across successive nodes and trace communication between two parties. In other words, each node should act like a mix [1] .
Member Security and Join Procedure
Analogous to the de nition in [8] , we de ne anonymity for a user A as the set S of users in the group who are indistinguishable from that A, i.e., no other user or a passive adversary can resolve messages from A to a granularity ner than S. We assume that each user u requires a minimal acceptable level of anonymity, i.e. each user requires their corresponding S set to be of a minimum size. We call this minimum set size the security parameter, and denote it with ψu. Each user u may also 
4.3
The Network Abstraction and Processing Requirements
In this section we describe the precise networking requirements of P 5 . It was our design goal for P 5 to be easily implementable using the current Internet protocols, as such our networking requirements are meager.
P
5 requires the implementation of broadcast channels in which the source address cannot easily be determined. This can be ef ciently implemented using a application-layer multicast protocol. The transport level requirements of P 5 are minimal, and UDP would suf ce as the transport protocol for P 5 edges on the P topology. Lastly, note that during normal operation, P 5 members only remain joined to the same set of channels; they only change channels if the overall security policy changes or if the group dynamic changes drastically. Thus, the signaling load due to P 5 is low, and since the topologies within each channel is relatively static, the P 5 tree can be optimized to map ef ciently on to the underlying physical topology.
Host Requirements P 5 requires state, processing, and link bandwidth at each host. We discuss these requirements in turn:
• Suppose member A communicates using channel (b/m) • There is a single public-key decryption for every packet that member A receives . Further, A has to encrypt every signal packet during communication. However, in general,
A does not have to encrypt noise packets; it is only necessary that the adversary not be able to distinguish noise packets from signal packets. Thus, it is feasible for A to generate noise packets using a good local random number source.
• The broadcast nature of P 
The Random Channels Model
In this section, we present an analysis of the paths in a P 5 network. Let n be the number of users in the system, and suppose there are k channels available in total. For some integer t (which is typically smallat most 5), each user u independently chooses t random channels without replacement: we will denote this random set of t channels by S(u). Two central parameters for us will be: (i) d, the maximum hop-count between any 2 users, which is the maximum communication distance between any two users, and (ii) Lmin and Lmax, the minimum and maximum load (number of users) on any channel. Note that L min and L max are different than the security parameters as they count only the set of users local to a channel, while the security parameters count the set of users in all channels that provide anonymity for a given user. We next discuss these two parameters.
The parameter d. We say that there is a path u = u 0 , u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u = v between two users u and v, if for each i, users ui and ui+1 choose a channel in common. The length of such a path is de ned to be , and the minimum length of any path between u and v is the distance or hop-count between u and v; if there is no such path, then this hop-count is de ned to be ∞. We are interested in bounding d, the maximum hop-count between any two users.
The load parameters L min and L max . De ne the load on a channel to be the number of users who chose it among their t random channels; let L min and L max respectively be the minimum and maximum loads on any channel. A lower bound on the former is needed to guarantee the security of the system, and an upper bound on the latter is required to show that the bandwidth overhead is not signi cant.
Given the above discussion, our basic goals will be as follows.
Clearly, we simultaneously want small d, a value of L min that is not too small, and Lmax being not too high. It is easy to see that the expected load on any given channel is exactly t · n/k. Thus, n/k is a natural parameter to study our system with. So, we will consider scenarios where k is constrained to be at most some given value K, and n/k is required to be at least some given value λ. So, the primary parameters are K, t, and λ. Given these, and for any choice of (n, k) for which k ≤ K and n/k ≥ λ, we aim to show that the system has the abovesketched satisfactory properties w.r.t. d, L min , and L max .
More concretely, we will proceed as follows. Fix = 0.3, say. Let As denote the desirable event that (i) all the channel loads are within 1 ± of the expected value tλ, and (ii) d ≤ s.
We derive the following suf cient conditions for As to hold (for s = 2, 3) with a probability of at least 1 − 10
1. s = 2: two suf cient conditions are (P1) t = 3, λ ≥ 100, and K ≤ 100; or (P2) t = 4, λ ≥ 80, and K ≤ 300. We now prove that these conditions are indeed suf cient, in the rest of this section.
Analysis Approach
In our analysis, we will frequently use the union bound or
The parameters L min and L max are much more tractable than d, so we handle them rst. Let exp(x) denote e x . It is an easy consequence of large-deviations bounds such as the Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds [3, 7] that for any given channel c and any parameter ∈ [0, 1], its load L(c) satis es:
Now, a simple application of the union bound yields
We next turn to bounding d. We cannot directly draw on the rich random graphs literature, since we are working here with a certain model of random hypergraphs with possibly repeated hyperedges. We next study the two requirements of most interest: d ≤ 2 and d ≤ 3. As can be expected, the second case involves more work than the rst. Our basic plan is as follows. is upper-bounded by the sum of (1) and the probability bound given by Lemma 5.1. Similarly, Pr[A3] is upper-bounded by the sum of (1) and the bound given by Lemma 5.2. We shall do this putting together in Section 5.4.
The Requirement d ≤ 2
Here, we want suf cient conditions for d ≤ 2 to hold with high probability. In other words, we want to show that for any two users, there is a path of length at most 2 between them.
To do so, we x distinct users u and v, and upper-bound the probability p that there is no path of length 2 between them; then, by the union bound, the probability of d > 2 is at most ) −1 , which we proceed to do now.
Our plan is to condition on the values of S(u) and S(v).
For each such choice, we will upper-bound the probability that there is no user (among the remaining (n − 2)) who chose a channel that intersects both S(u) and S(v). Then, the maximum such probability is an upper-bound on p. 
Thus, since different users w make their random choices independently, we get that p ≤ (1 − f (k, t) ) n−2 ≤ exp(−(n − 2)f (k, t)). Thus, as discussed above, a union bound yields
In order to see what this bound says for various concrete values of our parameters K, λ, t, we develop: (2) shows that
We can now do a calculation to show that subject to our constraints (which includes the constraint that k ≥ 2t), this bound is maximized when k = K and n = λK. Further simpli cation then leads to the bound of the lemma. 
In other words, Y (A) is the set of channels that lie outside of A, but which lie in some set S(x) that intersects A. Thus, we need to show that with high probability, at least one of the following four conditions holds for each pair of users u and v:
To do so, we will instead show that with high probability, all A ⊆ C with |A| = t will have |Y (A)| > s, where s = (k − 2t)/2 . It can be veri ed that this implies that at least one of the conditions (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) will hold for all u, v.
We summarize with
Proof. (Sketch.) A union bound using (3) yields
A calculation shows that subject to our constraints, this bound is maximized when k = K and n = λK. Further simpli cation completes the proof. 
Putting It Together
Now, as described at the end of Section 5.1, we just do routine calculations to verify the following. First, if s = 2 and any one of (P1) and (P2) holds, then the sum of (1) and the probability bound given by Lemma 5.1 is at most 10 −4 . Similarly, if s = 3
and any one of (P3) and (P4) holds, then the sum of (1) and the probability bound given by Lemma 5.2 is at most 10 −4 . This concludes our proof sketch about these suf cient conditions for A2 and A3 respectively to hold with high probability.
Simulation Results
In this section, we present results from a packet-level P 5 simulator. Our simulator is written in C, and can simulate the entire P 5 protocol with thousands of participants. We designed and implemented ve basic experiments:
• Measure system performance as the number of participants increase; speci cally, we measure the end-to-end bandwidth, latency, and packet drop rates as the number of users in the system is increased We assume an unbounded input queue length and a bounded output queue. All packets received at a node at a given time step are processed. Some of these packets may be queued at appropriate output queues, and a subset of them may be delivered locally. Next, each node generates a set of outgoing packets and enqueues these on the output queues. We then impose the output queue limit and according to the queuing discipline, discard packets if any output queue is larger than its maximum speci ed size. Note that during the discard phase, the node does not discriminate whether it is dropping its own packets or packets from some other node. All remaining packets at an output queue are delivered in the next time step to the next hop node.
Since all packets queued at a node are delivered at the next time step, the output queue size serves as a measure of both the processing and bandwidth requirements at a node. We instrumented the simulator to record the end-to-end latencies (number of simulator ticks), drop rates and bandwidth, end-to-end hop counts, number of channel crossings, and convergence times. In the rest of this section, we report results from individual experiments. In Figure 2 , we plot the end-to-end loss rate as the number of users in the system is increased. In each case, there is only one pair of communicating nodes; all other nodes only send noise packets. For each group size, we chose ten different random seeds and created ten different topologies. For each topology, we chose three different sender-receiver pairs. Each point on Figure 2 is an average of all these runs (24 for each topology size). Unless otherwise noted, we choose the values of security parameters as ψ = 100, and η = 300, and implement nonuniform queuing. All nodes in the system were connected to two channels, i.e. they had one communication key and one routing key.
Scalability
There are two different curves, each corresponding to two different sending rates. In the Sending Rate=1/S case, each node generates a packet at each time stop with probability 1/S, where S is the size of its current broadcast group. Analogously, in the Sending Rate=log S/S case, each node generates a packet at each time stop with probability log S/S. For both cases, the queue sizes at each node were very small: max{10, log S}. From the plot, it is clear that the 1/S sending rate can be sustained in the system, and almost no signal (or noise) packets are lost. However, as the sending rate is increased, the queues in the system are saturated, and drop rates increase with group size.
In Figure 3 , we plot the average number of channels that the signal packets have to cross in order to reach their destination.
Note that in this case, each user only connects to 2 channels.
As predicted by the analysis in Section 5, the average channel level hop count is very small, and is less than 1 for all our runs.
The average end-to-end hop count in these runs were ∼ 13. The worst case inter-channel distance that we encountered in these runs was 2. This occurred in 4 out of 6000 signal packets sent. Table; in the experiment we xed the security parameters (at ψ = 100, η = 300), and varied the number of users. In the second experiment, we xed the number of users at 1024, and varied the security parameter (ψ). In all cases, we used η = 3ψ.
In all experiments, all the users join simultaneously at time 0. Each user migrates down the L tree in rounds. Each round consists of 10 simulator ticks, and each user only makes a single migration decision in any one round. As expected, the convergence times increase as the number of users increase (or the ψ parameter is decreased) since each user settles lower down in L. However, in all cases the number of rounds to converge is given by max{0, log N − log ψ}.
Noise and Signal Generation
In Figure 4 , we vary the sending rate while keeping all other parameter xed. We monitor a single senderreceiver pair, and report the observed packet loss. We use the two base sending rates from Section 6.1, and linearly increase these rates by the rate multipliers plotted on the x-axis, while keeping the link bandwidths constant. As expected, the drop rates increase linearly with increases in sending rate. Interestingly, the non-uniform drop rates perform slightly better as the sending rates increase.
In Figure 5 , we repeat the same experiment and vary the number of sender-receiver pairs in the system. The rest of the users still generate noise at the same rate (log S/S). We plot the average drop rate across all of the sender-receiver pairs. As expected, the drop rate is not affected by the number of sender receiver pairs, and thus, no extra information is divulged to a We have also experimented with different values of ψ and η.
As expected, the drop rate increases as users choose higher values of the security parameters, since they are mapped to larger broadcast groups.
Conclusions
We divide our conclusions for P 5 in to two parts. In developing P 5 , we found an interesting property relating communication latency, bandwidth usage, and anonymity. In general, we found it was easy to construct protocols that provided two out of these three properties, e.g., consider plain unicast communication: it provides low latency and high bandwidth usage, but does not provide anonymity. Now consider multicasting to a set (using per-source shortest path trees) in which the message is intended for only one member of the group. This solution provides low latency; however the bandwidth utility decreases as the anonymity and unlinkability increases. P 5 has the interesting property that it allows individual users to tradeoff these three properties on-line.
Observations
We designed P 5 to be scalable and compatible with current
Internet protocols. Our simulations show that P 5 can scale to large groups, and our analysis shows that P 5 will maintain its short paths property with very little extra overhead for extremely large groups. Our current work is to adapt lower overhead noise generation algorithms to further improve scalability;
provide better reliability by considering more connected structures within individual groups; and to build a prototype for deployment around the Internet.
A Note on Ethics
There may be some questions about why a system like P where sender-and receiver-privacy is all that is required. P 5 ,
however, also provides sender-receiver privacy, and like all technologies, this can be used in a malicious manner. We have decided to include sender-receiver privacy in P 5 for the following reasons:
• We believe it is important to study these protocols, simply to learn what levels of anonymity are feasible over a public network such as the Internet.
• The protocol-steps in P 5 that provide sender-receiver anonymity can be decoupled from the rest of the protocol, and P 5 can be used in sender-, receiver-anonymity mode only. It is an orthogonal ethical (and possibly political) decision as to whether P 5 should be implemented to provide sender-receiver anonymity.
• We describe an attack that can be mounted by an powerful active adversary, speci cally an adversary who can inject packets on a arbitrary set of network links. P 5 fails under such an attack.
